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CHAP TE R 3
The Posse Comitatus Act
and Disaster Response
Michael Greenberger and Arianne Spaccarelli
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The Posse Comitatus Act does not restrict
the use of military forces in disasters, except
when it comes to law enforcement missions.
The president can authorize military troops for
law enforcement should catastrophic events
prevent states from protecting constitutional
rights or properly executing U.S. law.
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The images of a major American city descending into lawlessness and chaos more characteristic of a war-torn third-world country has become burned into the American
consciousness in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Even five years later, we continue to
debate what went wrong, who was to blame, and how to prevent such a tragedy from
recurring. The delayed federal response, in particular the failure to quickly send active
duty troops and other military assets to Louisiana, has been central to much of the
criticism of the response effort. Although bureaucratic and operational ineptitude at
the state and federal level certainly bear their share of the blame for this delay, the primary cause was President George W. Bush’s perceived lack of statutory or constitutional authority to assume command of response efforts by the National Guard or to
override Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco’s refusal to allow a unified
command structure for active duty federal forces and the National Guard forces under
an Army general.1
This perception arose from a narrow interpretation of both the Posse Comitatus
Act,2 which bars the use of federal troops for domestic law enforcement3 under most
circumstances, and constitutional principles of federalism and limited government
authority. The disastrous consequences of such an interpretation drove Congress to
enact the Warner Amendment (subsequently repealed) to the Insurrection Act, which
granted the president explicit authority to deploy federal troops without the consent of
the affected state to respond to natural disasters and other major domestic emergencies.4 Indeed, even before Hurricane Katrina, experts recognized the need for greater
military assistance during disaster response efforts. On October 1, 2002, the president established the U.S. Northern Command “to provide command and control of
Department of Defense homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support
of civil authorities.”5 Despite the ongoing controversy about the role of the military in
domestic disaster response that led to the repeal of the Warner Amendment,6 diverse
leaders and experts have continued to emphasize the military’s critical and indispensable role in responding to catastrophic events.7 The Department of Defense itself has
acted to enhance the military’s response capabilities, assigning an active duty unit as
an on-call federal response force for domestic disasters for the first time in the nation’s
history.8
Despite the controversy and confusion about the Posse Comitatus Act’s restriction on the use of military forces domestically, the Warner Amendment was not necessary to provide the federal government sufficient authority to unilaterally respond to a
natural disaster such as Hurricane Katrina. As is shown in this chapter, the complete
breakdown of law and order during a catastrophic emergency was and is sufficient to
authorize the president to unilaterally deploy federal troops under the Posse Comitatus Act and the Constitution.
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U.S. Coast Guard Petty Officer Second Class Shawn Beaty of Long Island, New York, looks
for survivors in the wake of Hurricane Katrina as he flies over New Orleans, August 30, 2005.
Photo by U.S. Coast Guard Petty Officer Second Class NyxoLyno Cangemi. U.S. Navy.

OVERVIEW OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT
The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) prohibits the use of federal troops for law enforcement purposes “except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by
Congress.”9 The PCA has been in force since 1878, when it was enacted as part of a
backlash against the imposition of federal martial law in the former Confederate states
during Reconstruction.10 Congress was concerned that the deployment of the military
in the South was being used more as a political weapon than as a means of defending
the country and maintaining order.11 As the statutory language shows, however, Congress also recognized that there would be times when domestic military deployment
would be necessary and constitutionally permissible.
The PCA applies directly only to active duty federal troops in the Army and Air
Force. However, the Department of Defense issued a directive making its restriction
on domestic law enforcement activities applicable to the Navy and Marine Corps.12
The Coast Guard, which is under the control of the Department of Homeland Security and not the Department of Defense, is not covered by the PCA.13
The status of the National Guard is more complicated because National Guard
personnel are simultaneously members of their state militias and the federal Army
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reserve.14 When a National Guard unit is under the command of its state’s governor,
the PCA does not apply to its actions and it may perform civilian law enforcement
functions to the extent permitted by its state’s laws. However, when the Guard is called
into federal service by the president, it is part of the active federal military.
Active federal military forces may, without constraint by the PCA, perform a variety of disaster assistance tasks, including delivering supplies and conducting search
and rescue operations.15 They may also assist civilian law enforcement agencies by, for
example, providing training or equipment.16 After Hurricane Katrina, the Department
of Defense provided active duty federal forces for these purposes, but their deployment
to Louisiana was delayed, both because of bureaucratic roadblocks and because of the
aforementioned concerns and conflicts about federal command of the overall response
effort by federal troops and National Guard forces under state command.17 The Bush
administration attempted to prevent the latter problem by either having the federal
military assume command of all Department of Defense and National Guard personnel or having General Russel Honoré, the commander of the Department’s Joint Task
Force Katrina, assume command of the unified forces after being sworn in as a member of the Louisiana National Guard.18 Governor Blanco rejected both proposals. Federal troops may not, however, participate directly in law enforcement operations, such
as riot control or search and seizures, unless authorized by a statutory or constitutional
exception to the PCA.19

STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS TO THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT
There are numerous statutory exceptions to the PCA.20 Some, like Section 1416(a)
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997,21 are narrowly
drawn to address specific types of crises; others, like the Insurrection Act,22 grant
broader authority for the federal military to intervene during times of domestic
turmoil. Despite the concerns that hindered federal response efforts during Hurricane Katrina, the federal government recognized in the December 2004 National
Response Plan (NRP) that the statutory and constitutional exceptions provided
adequate authority for a unilateral deployment of federal troops during a disaster
of national consequence that overwhelmed state and local response capabilities.
Nevertheless, this official recognition in the NRP was undermined by widespread
uncertainty about the PCA. Some of this arises because of lay observers’ focus on the
general prohibition on the use of the military without investigating possible exceptions. Some of it arises from confusion about when and to what extent certain exceptions apply.23
The two principal statutory exceptions that apply across a broad range of catastrophes are the Insurrection Act and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
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Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act).24 These statutes are discussed in detail
below. In addition, there are numerous other statutes providing exceptions for certain activities or under certain circumstances, ranging from a statute exempting the
Department of Defense’s Inspector General from the PCA 25 to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.26 The principal exceptions are discussed briefly in the following sections.
Insurrection Act

Almost continuously since 1792, the president has possessed the statutory authority to deploy military personnel to suppress insurrections and rebellions.27 The current Insurrection Act was enacted in 1807 and has remained in effect, with very little
alteration, for over 200 years.28 In its current form, the Insurrection Act permits the
deployment of federal military forces to suppress insurrections and domestic violence
and to enforce federal law in three circumstances:
❯

❯

❯

The first provision of the Act permits federal military intervention to suppress an insurrection in a state upon the request of that state’s governor or
legislature.29 President George H. W. Bush used his authority under this provision to deploy troops to suppress domestic violence during the 1992 Los
Angeles riots at the request of the California governor.30
The second provision of the Act permits the president, on his or her own initiative, to suppress rebellion or enforce federal laws if he or she believes that
“unlawful obstructions, combinations, assemblages, or rebellion against the
authority of the United States make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the
United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.”31
This language reflects the earliest version of the Insurrection Act, the Militia Act of 1792,32 which was used by President George Washington to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion in 1795, despite the reluctance of Pennsylvania’s
governor.33
Finally, the Act permits the president “to take such measures as he considers
necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it (1) so hinders the execution of the laws of
that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of
its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in
the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that
State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or
to give that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws
of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.”34 This
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Left to right: U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, commander of Joint Task Force Katrina; U.S.
Army Maj. Gen. Bill Caldwell, 82nd Airborne Division Commander; and Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld discuss Hurricane Katrina relief efforts as they walk through the airport
in New Orleans, September 4, 2005. Photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Kevin J. Gruenwald.
U.S. Department of Defense.

section explicitly permits the president to act when a state’s actions or inactions deprive its citizens of equal protection of the law, reflecting its origins
in the post–Civil War period.35 This provision authorized President Dwight
Eisenhower’s deployment of federal troops to enforce a desegregation order in
Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957.36
The third provision of the Act is of particular interest in the context of a catastrophe such as Hurricane Katrina, during which a state is unable to provide the basic
guarantees of government and public safety to a large number of its residents. In addition to the widespread looting and privations experienced by ordinary citizens left
behind in New Orleans, the legal system in the city and state was so devastated by the
shortage of police, prison guards, attorneys, and resources that thousands of individuals detained in its jails were deprived of even the basics of constitutional criminal process.37 Such a governmental collapse arguably deprives citizens of their constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws and, if so, justifies unilateral federal intervention
under the Insurrection Act.
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Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act of 1974

The Stafford Act is the principal authority for providing disaster assistance and relief
to the states and territories. It authorizes the federal government to provide a wide
range of assistance to states, local governments, and individuals in response to major
emergencies. In order to trigger assistance under the Act, the president must declare a
disaster or state of emergency. Qualifying events under the Act include natural disaster
and other catastrophes that require assistance to “save lives and to protect property and
public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of
the United States.”38
Usually, a presidential declaration must be made at the request of a state’s governor, but the president may make an emergency declaration (but not a major disaster
declaration) unilaterally if “the emergency involves a subject area for which, under
the Constitution or laws of the United States, the United States exercises exclusive
or preeminent responsibility and authority.”39 When a declaration under the Act is
issued at the request of a governor, the governor is responsible for describing the nature
and scope of the emergency and for specifying the type of assistance his or her state
requires.40
The Act authorizes federal agencies to provide a wide range of assistance to
address immediate threats to life and property, including using, lending, or donating
federal equipment, supplies, facilities, personnel, and other resources, and by providing medicine, food, and other consumables through state and local governments or
designated relief agencies.41 In order to save lives or protect property, federal agencies
may also perform services on private or public property to remove debris; perform
search and rescue; provide emergency medical care; provide food, water, medicine, and
other essential supplies; clear roads; and generally reduce “immediate threats to public health and safety.”42 If requested by the affected state’s governor, the president may
deploy Department of Defense resources and personnel to assist in response and recovery efforts.43

Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) gives the president and the Environmental Protection Agency broad
authority to respond to the release or threatened release of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants that imminently endanger public health or welfare.44 The
National Contingency Plan promulgated pursuant to this statute calls for the Department of Defense to use its resources in responding to releases and threatened releases
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covered by the statute.45 This authorization constitutes an exception to the PCA and
does not require the request or permission of the affected state’s governor.
CERCLA defines pollutants and contaminants broadly, to include, but not be
limited to, “any element, substance, compound, or mixture, including disease-causing
agents, which after release into the environment or indirectly by ingestion through food
chains, will or may reasonably be anticipated to cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutation, physiological malfunctions, . . . or physical deformations.”46 This definition clearly encompasses many substances that could be released in a
chemical, biological, or radiological event or as a result of a natural disaster.
Once a release of contaminants or pollutants has occurred, the president may act
to remove and remediate the effects of the substance, including taking security measures to limit access to the site, temporarily or permanently relocating individuals
threatened by the release, and providing any emergency assistance that may otherwise
be provided under the Stafford Act.47 The president may also, after giving notice to the
affected state, issue “such orders as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the environment.”48 As reflected in the National Contingency Plan,49 these
broad authorities have been interpreted to authorize the president’s unilateral deployment of active duty military to an affected area for law enforcement purposes in order
to allow the federal government to carry out its duties under CERCLA.
Other Statutory Exceptions

Congress has enacted more than 20 other exceptions to the PCA.50 In addition to
exceptions that are intended to be used for more or less routine policing functions on
federally controlled land,51 there are several that apply during environmental and public health emergencies. These include the following:
❯

❯

❯

The Secretary of the Navy may assist in federal quarantine and isolation
efforts at any port of the United States by providing vessels at the request of
the Secretary of Health and Human Services.52
The Attorney General may request the Department of Defense to assist in
enforcing laws against criminal transactions in nuclear materials if an emergency situation exists. This can include assisting in arrest and other law
enforcement activities.53
The Secretary of Defense may assist the Department of Justice in responding
to an emergency involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction when it “poses a serious threat to the interests of the United States” and
“civilian expertise and capabilities are not readily available” to handle the situation.54 This includes personnel, equipment, and supplies to identify, monitor, and dispose of the weapons involved.55 Direct law enforcement assistance,
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such as performing searches and seizures as part of a criminal investigation,
may be provided only when it is “considered necessary for the immediate protection of human life and civilian law enforcement officials are not capable of
taking the action.”56

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE POSSE
COMITATUS ACT AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
A bedrock constitutional assumption underlying federal–state relations is that the
federal government may not invade the states’ police powers unless authorized by the
Constitution. Even in the absence of the PCA, this limits the power of the federal government to deploy troops for domestic law enforcement purposes to circumstances
under which the Constitution empowers the president or Congress to act. Similarly,
Congress cannot usurp the president’s constitutional authority to deploy troops
domestically merely by enacting the PCA.
The PCA therefore presents two constitutional questions. First, what is the constitutional authority for statutory exceptions to the PCA? The answer is found in five
principal constitutional provisions: the Insurrection, Guarantee, Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Spending Clauses.
Second, what, if any, constitutional exceptions exist to the PCA’s ban on the use
of military for domestic law enforcement purposes? Although the text of the PCA
contemplates constitutional exceptions, the question defies easy answers. Not only is
the case law scant and the scholarship conflicted, but the drafters of the legislation
themselves disagreed on whether such exceptions existed.57 Nevertheless, the Guarantee Clause appears to provide a solid basis for unilateral presidential action in this area.
This section discusses the constitutional parameters of the use of federal military forces for domestic law enforcement, including uses authorized by Congress and
undertaken under the president’s own authority.
Insurrection Clause

The years immediately following the end of the Revolutionary War were marked by
civil turmoil and unrest, giving the Founders good cause for anxiety about the democratic stability of both the state and federal governments. This anxiety was inspired
not only by external threats but by internal dissension within states and between citizens and the federal government. In particular, the 1787 Shays’ Rebellion, a farmer’s
insurrection against taxes in Massachusetts, exposed the fragility of the new nation.
Massachusetts suppressed the rebellion after the rebels seized a federal arsenal, but the
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U.S. Army Capt. Jesse Stewart, a ranger assigned to the 3505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, conducts a patrol of the debris-ravaged Superdome
in New Orleans, September 8, 2005. The regiment provided security to ensure no one
entered the area that the Environmental Protection Agency condemned. Photo by Staff
Sgt. Jacob N. Bailey. U.S. Army.

state had found itself unable to rely on either a national government or its fellow states
for support.58 Shays’ Rebellion inspired not only the earliest version of the Insurrection Act,59 but influenced the drafters of the Constitution to include the Insurrection
and Guarantee Clauses to authorize the federal government to suppress rebellions on
its own initiative and guarantee states and their citizens support in maintaining stable
governments.
The Insurrection Clause empowers Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”60 The Insurrection Clause, along with the Guarantee Clause, provides the
primary authority for the Insurrection Act. As discussed previously, various versions
of the Insurrection Act have been used to suppress riots and rebellions since 1792.
Although Congress has opted to require a state’s permission to deploy troops under
many circumstances, the Insurrection Clause does not require such circumspection.
The Clause provides ample authority for Congress to authorize unilateral deployment
of federal troops during insurrections and civil unrest so severe as to cause a complete
breakdown of law and order in the affected area.
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Guarantee Clause

The Guarantee Clause has its roots in the same tumultuous period as the Insurrection
Clause. The Guarantee Clause provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”61 Unlike the Insurrection Clause, the Guarantee Clause imposes an affirmative duty on all branches of the
federal government to act to secure a republican form of government in each state. Neither the duty nor the power it creates is confined to a particular branch of government,
indicating that it confers authority on both Congress and the president.
The scope of the Guarantee Clause authority has not been tested. However, it is
noteworthy that President Abraham Lincoln based his authority for taking military
action against the South during the Civil War on the Guarantee Clause rather than on
his war powers.62 In addition to any authority granted by statutes like the Insurrection
Act, the collapse of a functioning government during a catastrophic emergency likely
triggers the protections and powers of the Guarantee Clause because such a collapse
deprives citizens of the benefits and protection of a republican form of government.
The president would not require congressional authorization or the state’s permission
to deploy federal troops under these circumstances because he would be fulfilling his
constitutional duty to restore a republican form of government to the affected state.
Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause affords Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes.”63 The Supreme
Court has long held that the Commerce Clause permits Congress to “regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate
commerce.”64 Even when intervening in areas not directly tied to commerce, the Commerce Clause, at a minimum, empowers Congress to regulate activities and respond to
situations that “substantially affect interstate commerce.”65
Catastrophic emergencies, such as Hurricane Katrina or the World Trade Center
attacks of September 11, 2001, unquestionably have an enormous impact on interstate
commerce. The devastating economic effects of a disaster are rarely confined to the
affected state. For example, the 9/11 attacks cost the nation’s businesses billions of dollars and left tens of thousands of workers unemployed.66 Hurricane Katrina caused
$100 billion of property damage in several states, sent thousands of victims across state
borders, and seriously disrupted oil production and refining.67
Although some scholars have argued that recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence
has significantly limited the ability of Congress to legislate in areas, like domestic law
enforcement, that fall within the states’ traditional police powers,68 the direct and
severe economic impact of catastrophic emergencies would justify congressional authorization for the unilateral deployment of federal troops even under the more rigorous scrutiny applied to such actions in recent years.69 Moreover, Gonzales v. Raich70
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shows that the concern about stricter Commerce Clause jurisprudence is overblown.
In Raich, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress, through the Controlled Substance
Act,71 could regulate entirely intrastate commerce in the growth, distribution, and sale
of marijuana for medicinal purposes and preempt state legislation supporting such
commerce, because the production in question affected interstate commerce by endangering the nation’s public health.72 In so ruling, the majority rejected the argument
that this exercise of Commerce Clause authority “encroached on the States’ traditional
police powers to . . . protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.”73 Raich
strongly indicates that even if an emergency’s immediate consequences are confined to
a single state, unilateral federal response, including deployment of troops, is a proper
exercise of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce.

Necessary and Proper Clause

The Necessary and Proper Clause provides Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [in Article I], and all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”74 The Necessary and
Proper Clause is particularly important to regulation of local, noneconomic activities
incidental to Congress’s exercise of its Commerce Clause power, but it is also important
for the effective exercise of Congress’s powers under the Insurrection and Guarantee
Clauses. Although sometimes overlooked, it is important to note that the Necessary
and Proper Clause formed part of the basis for the decision in Raich.75 According to
Justice Antonin Scalia’s concurrence, while local production, sale, and use of marijuana were not themselves part of interstate commerce, Congress had the power to
regulate them because they could undermine the prohibition on interstate commerce
in marijuana.76 The reasoning in both the majority and concurring opinions in Raich
indicate that the Necessary and Proper Clause is a proper basis to legislate on matters that, while not squarely within a subject matter covered by its other constitutional
authorities, are nevertheless necessary to effectively exercise the federal government’s
constitutional powers.

Spending Clause

The Spending Clause authorizes Congress to tax and spend for the general welfare.77
Like the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Spending Clause does not provide direct
authority for deployment of federal troops for law enforcement purposes in response
to a catastrophic event. However, Congress often uses its Spending Clause authority to
assert federal control in areas that would otherwise be the sole domain of state governments by requiring states to meet certain standards or take certain actions in order to
be eligible for federal aid. While states can challenge such conditions as congressional
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overreaching, they are usually upheld under the standard set forth in South Dakota
v. Dole.78 If Congress deemed it necessary, it could condition receipt of Stafford Act
disaster assistance, for example, on a state’s consent to permit the deployment of federal military in response to catastrophic events where the state is overwhelmed and
unable to either provide basic services to its citizens or effectively use federal resources.
Under South Dakota v. Dole, conditions placed on congressionally authorized
funds are a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power so long as they are stated
clearly, serve the general welfare, are reasonably related for the purpose for which federal funds are being allocated, and do not induce states to violate an independent constitutional bar.79 The condition on Stafford Act funds suggested above would almost
certainly comply with this test. Any amendment to the Act could set forth a clear standard for when deployment of troops would be required. As it would be enacted solely
for the purpose of protecting the health and safety of citizens impacted by the disaster,
it would certainly serve the general welfare. Likewise, the purpose of deploying troops
would be the same as the purpose of providing disaster assistance in the first place—
saving lives and protecting property during an emergency.
The Tenth Amendment may present an independent constitutional bar, in violation of the fourth prong of the test. Indeed, the Warner Amendment’s supposed violation of the police powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment was part
of the argument used by state governors and others who opposed it.80 Although in
most situations, such as the requirement that states raise the minimum drinking age
in order to receive federal highway funds,81 any Tenth Amendment issues are satisfied
by the state’s ability to simply refuse funds.82 However, in Dole the Court recognized
that “in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be
so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ “83 Nevertheless, many emergency response resources are available for purchase by the states in
the private sector. States also have access to mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), under which 20,000 civilians and
46,500 National Guard personnel, along with substantial material and supplies, were
provided to the Gulf Coast region by other states.84 It is true that EMAC requires an
aid-requesting state to reimburse aid-rendering states unless the aid-rendering states
waive reimbursement.85 This makes relying on EMAC in the absence of federal disaster relief funds to cover the costs less attractive and, in some cases, infeasible. Nevertheless, even during emergencies and major disasters, a state is not without alternate
options, even if the option of federal aid is the most attractive and convenient.

CONCLUSION
The deployment of federal military troops domestically is among the most controversial issues in disaster and emergency response. While the PCA and the Constitution
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do place significant restrictions on the domestic use of federal troops for such traditional law enforcement and state functions as riot control, arrest, and interdiction,
they are not so restrictive as to tie Congress’s and the president’s hands when faced
with a catastrophe that overwhelms an affected state’s ability to provide essential government functions. The Insurrection, Guarantee, and Commerce Clauses directly
empower Congress to authorize deployment of federal troops under these circumstances even without a state’s request or permission. And while existing statutory
exceptions, particularly the Insurrection Act, provide the president with adequate
authority to deploy troops under such circumstances, the Guarantee Clause provides
an important constitutional exception to the PCA restrictions. Under the Guarantee
Clause, the president probably has the power to unilaterally deploy troops when an
event causes so much damage that local and state governments are unable to provide
their citizens with the basic rights and protections that must be secured by a republican form of government.
Although existing law provides more than adequate authority for the deployment of federal troops without a state’s consent in situations like that faced by New
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, it may nevertheless be useful to clarify this authority
by enacting additional legislation. If Congress is unwilling to make federal authority
more explicit through such bald language as in the repealed Warner Amendment, it
may choose to do so by using its spending power to condition receipt of federal disaster
aid on permitting deployment of federal troops in certain circumstances. This solution would clarify authorities during natural disaster in particular and at least partially assuage the states’ concerns about the usurpation of their authority by the federal
government.
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